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pra, 71 A.C. 609, 613, 78 Cal.Rptr. 718, 455 
P.2d 822; Jones v. Workmen's Compo App. 
Bd., supra, 68 Cal.2d 476, 479-480, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 544, 439 P.2d 648; Standard Recti-
fier Corp. V. Workmen's Compo App. Bel. 
(1%6) 65 Cal.2d 287, 292, 54 Cal.Rptr. 
100, 419 P.2d 164; Allied Compo Ins. 
Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm. (1%1) 57 
Cal.Zd 115, 122, 17 Cal.Rptr. 817, 367 
P.2d 409; Liberty Mut. Ins. CO. V. In-
dustrial Acc. Comm. (1948) 33 CaI.2d 89, 
94, 199 P.2d 302), the referee here relies 
upon no medical authority in concluding 
that petitioner is not disabled from per-
forming the lifting required in his oc-
cupation. Both Dr. Messinger and Dr. 
Dedinsky, the only two physicians who have 
seen or treated petitioner since his tempo-
rary disability payments ceased, have con-
cluded that petitioner cannot perform work 
requiring lifting. Neither doctor has· re-
leased petitioner from the lifting limita-
tion. In essence, the referee's report con-
fronts petitioner with the grisly choice of 
obeying the medical advice of his treating 
physician or risking further injury by fol-
lowing the medical views of the referee.23 
[8j We hold that the appeals board and 
the referee lacked substantial evidence in 
concluding that petitioner was not suffering 
from temporary disability which would en-
title him to temporary disability compensa-
tion. 
The decision of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Appeals Board is annulled and the 
cause remanded to that board for pro-
ceedings consistent with the views ex-
pressed herein. 
TRAYNOR, C. J., and PETERS, 
MOSK, BURKE and SULLIVAN, JJ., 
conCUT. 
23. The referee disclosed his attitude toward 
the uncontradicted medical advice of Dr. 
Dedinsky, the insurance carrier's doctor, 
and Dr. Messinger, the doctor retained by 
petitioner's attorney, by observing, "He 
does not think: he could go back to this 
type of work, because he cannot lift; 
463 P .2d-28Va 
McCOMB, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. I would affirm the decision of 
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals 
Board. 
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Thurlow E. COON et al., Plaintiffs, Cross .. 
defendant and Appellants, 
Y. 
Louis FREEMAN et al., Defendants, Cross .. 
complainants and Respondents. 
L. A. 29662. 
Sup~me Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Jan. 15, 1970. 
Action for declaratory relief. The 
Superior Court, San Diego County, George 
R. Kirk, J., rendered judgment, and appeal 
was taken. The Supreme Court, Traynor, 
C. J., held that under general corporation 
law provision that "member" includes each 
person signing articles of nonstock corpo-
ration and each person admitted to mem-
bership therein, and general nonprofit cor-
poration law provision that provisions of 
general corporation law apply to nonprofit 
corporations except as to matters specifi-
cally otherwise provided for in general 
nonprofit corporation law, and general 
nonprofit corporation law provision that 
directors are members of nonprofit corpo-
ration whose articles or bylaws do not pro-
vide for members as such or which has no 
members other than directors, directors 
and not merely remaining incorporators, 
were members of nonprofit corporation 
however, he has not tried lifting." (Ital-
ics added.) The doctors have forbidden 
petitioner to lift anything heavier than 
25 pounds, much less the 200 to 250 
pound stock found at his former employ-
ment. 
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whose bylaws provided for membership but 
which had admitted no new members. 
Affirmed. 
Opinion, Ca1.App., 77 Ca1.Rptr. 448, 
vacated. 
I. Corporations ~170 
Undel' general corporation law provi-
sion that "member" includes each person 
signing articles of nonstock corporation 
and each person admi~ted to membership 
therein, and general nonprofit corporation 
law provision that provisions of general 
corporation law apply to nonprofit corpo-
rations except as to matters specifically 
otherwise provided for in general nonprof-
it corporation law, and general nonprofit 
corporation law provision that directors 
are members of nonprofit corporation 
whose articles or bylaws do not provide 
for members as such or" which has no 
members other than directors, directors, 
and not. merely remaining incorporators, 
were members of nonprofit corporation 
whose bylaws provided for membership but 
which had admitted no new members. 
West's Ann.Corp.Code, §§ 104, 9002, 9603. 
2. Estoppel 0$;>87 
Provision added to bylaws of nonprof-
it corporation to effect that in event of 
dissolution the remaining assets would be 
distributed to organization exempt from 
federal income taxes did not estop corpora-
tion to deny that two of the original incor-
porators described as members in the pro-
vision were members, where the two incor-
porators were not misled thereby and did 
not change their position to their detriment 
in reliance thereon. 
Tom Sherrard, in pro. per., and Richard 
A. Thomas, San Diego, for plaintiffs, 
cross-defendants and appellants. 
I. This action was apparendy taken to 
comply with section 9606 of the Corpora-
tion Code, which provides: "Every non-
profit corporation shall keep a member-
ship book containing the name and 
Morrow & Young and Floyd L Morrow, 
San Diego, for defendants, cross-complain-
ants and respondents. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice. 
Plaintiffs Thurlow E. Coon and Tom 
Sherrard appeal from a judgment in an ac~ 
tion for declaratory relief that determined 
the membership of Basic Economic Educa-
tion, Inc., a California nonprofit corpora-
tion, and the validity of the acts of Basic's 
board of directors. 
Coon and Sherrard together with Gor-
don Gran, Sidney Evans, and Henry B. 
Cramer formed Basic on June 10, 1960 for 
the stated purpose of education in econom-
les. Neither the articles of incorporation 
nor the by-laws provided for members, but 
the articles named the five incorporators 
as the directors. 
On April 22, 1965 Coon resigned from 
the board of directors, and on April 30, the 
remaining directors elected Louis Freeman 
to fill the vacancy. In May 1965 Gordon 
Gran resigned, and the board elected Ever-
ett Seeley in his place. Friction developed 
thereafter between Sherrard and the other 
members of the board In December 1966, 
at a meeting that Sherrard declined to at~ 
tend, the other board members reelected 
themselves as directors and elected Irene 
Hickman as a director in place of Sher-
rard. 
In February 1967 Basic initiated a mem~ 
bership book,! which listed the five direc-
tors and Sherrard as members. Sherrard 
then told Coon and Gran that in his opin-
ion they were still members of Basic even 
though they had not been active in its af-
fairs since their resignations from the 
board of directors. Gran then resigned 
again and thus made clear he had severed 
all connection with Basic. About the same 
time Sidney Evans died, and the board 
elected Duval Jaros as a director in his 
place. 
address of each member. Termination of 
any membership shall be recorded in the 
book, together with the date on which the 
membership ceased." 
COON v. FREEMAN Cal. 443 
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Early in April 1967 Coon and Sherrard provided for by section 9603 of the Corpo-
called a meeting for April 20 of the three rations Code, a provision of the same part 
remaining incorporators, Coon, Sherrard, that includes section 9002. 
and Cramer, to assume control of Basic on 'Section 9603 provides that "Where nei-
the theory that as the remaining incorpora- ther the articles nor by-laws of a nonprofit 
tors, they were the only members. (See corporation provide for members thereof 
Corp. Code, § 104.) Cramer did not attend as such, and in any case in which any nOD-
the meeting, and Coon and Sherrard adopt- profit corporation has, in fact, no members 
ed a resolution amending Basic's by-laws other than the persons constituting its 
to provide that only the remaining incorpo- board of directors, the persons for the time 
rators were members. being constituting its governing body or 
On May 4, 1967 the board of directors 
adopted new by-laws, which provided for 
memberships. No new members, however, 
have been admitted pursuant to these by~ 
laws. 
On May 16, 1967 Coon and Sherrard 
brought this action for declaratory relief 
seeking to establish that Coon was a mem-
ber, that directors Freeman, Seeley, and 
Hickman were not members, and that the 
action taken at the meeting of April 20, 
1967 was binding on Basic. The directors 
and Basic cross-complained. They sought 
a declaration that only the directors and 
Sherrard were members, that the action 
taken at the meeting of April 20 was inval-
id, and that the by-laws adopted by the 
directors at the meeting of May 4 were the 
by-laws of Basic. The trial court entered 
judgment for Basic and its directors. 
[1] Section 104 of the Corporations 
Code, a provision of the General Corpora-
tion Law (Corp.Code, tid. 1, div. 1), pro-
vides that" 'Member' -includes each person 
signing the articles of a nonstoek corpora-
tion and each person admitted to member-
ship therein." Section 9002 of the Corpo-
rations Code, a provision of the General 
Nonprofit Corporation Law (Corp. Code, 
tit. 1, div. 2, pt. 1), provides that "The pro-
visions of the General Corporation Law 
* * * apply to corporations formed under 
this part, except as to matters specifically 
otherwise provided for in this part." On 
the basis of these sections Coon and Sher-
rard contend that as incorporators they are 
members of Basic. The directors and Ba-
sic contend, however, that the membership 
of Basic is a matter specifically otherwise 
board are, for the purpose of any statutory 
provision or rule of law relating to non~ 
profit corporations, the members of the 
corporation and shall exercise all the rights 
and powers of members thereof." 
Until the meeting of May 4, at which the 
directors adopted new by-laws providing 
for members, neither the articles nor the 
by-laws of Basic provided for "members 
* * * as such." The directors were 
therefore the members of Basic pursuant to 
section 9603. 
Coon and Sherrard contend, however, 
that section 9603 should not be interpreted 
to conflict with section 104, that therefore 
incorporators should be deemed members, 
and that accordingly, section 9603 is not 
operative unless there are no incorporators 
or members other than the persons consti-
tuting the board of directors. They would 
thus rewrite section 9603 by deleting the 
words "in any case in which any nonprofit 
corporation" and inserting in lieu thereof 
the words "when it," so that the section 
would read: "Where neither the articles 
nor by-laws of a nonprofit corporation 
provide for members thereof as such, and 
[when it] has, in fact, no members other 
than the persons constituting its board of 
directors, the persons * * * constituting 
its board are * * * the members." Only 
the most compelling considerations could 
justify such a departure from the language 
of the statute. (See Silver v. Brown (1966) 
63 Ca1.2d 841, 845, 48 Ca1.Rptr. 609, 409 P. 
2d 689.) There are no such considerations 
in this case. 
Section 9603 provides for the orderly 
manageme~t of a nonprofit corporation. If 
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no prOVlS10n for members is contained in 
the articles or by-laws, the directors be-
come the members. Although the articles 
or by-laws provide for members, if none 
have been admitted or all have terminated 
their membership, this section applies and 
the directors are members. 
Coon and Sherrard contend that al-
though section 104 is included in the Gen-
eral Corporation Law, it now applies only 
to nonprofit corporations (see 2 Ballantine 
& Sterling, California Corporation Laws 
(4th ed.) § 409), and should therefore be 
deemed part of the General Nonprofit 
Corporation Law. As such, they conclude, 
it should not be automatically displaced 
pursuant to section 9002 by inconsistent 
language in section 9603. To hold other-
wise, they urge, would render section 104 
meaningless. Even if we should assume, 
however, that section 104 applies only to 
nonprofit corporations, our giving effect to 
the plain language of section 9603 does not 
render section 104 meaningless. Section 
9603 assumes that there are persons consti-
tuting the board of directors. Cases may 
arise when there are no such persons and 
section 9603 could not apply. Section 104 
would then operate to make any existing 
incorporators members and thus reduce the 
possibility that a nonprofit corporation 
might be left with no one responsible for 
its affairs. 
Coon and Sherrard contend that section 
104 must be given effect to provide mem-
bers other than the directors to prevent the 
directors from abusing their powers. 
There is nothing in section 104, however, 
to indicate any such purpose. Moreover, if 
the existence of incorporators as members 
precluded section 9603 from constituting 
2. The concluding paragraph in the certifi-
cate of amendment stated: "The COrpora-
tion bad admitted no members other than 
the directors as the members when neither 
the articles nor by-laws provided for mem~ 
bers, power would be concentrated in an 
ever dwindling group of incorporators and 
the risks of abuse of power would thereby 
be enhanced. Indeed, in the present case, 
Coon and Sherrard as a majority of the 
three remaining incorporators sought to 
wrest control of Basic from the five-mem~ 
ber board of directors that had been elect-
ed to conduct Basic's affairs. 
[2] Finally, Coon and Sherrard contend 
that Basic should bc estopped to deny that 
they are both members, on the ground that 
they were described as such in a 1964 
resolution" that added article 6 to the arti-
cles of incorporation to provide that "In 
the event of' dissolution, all the remaining 
assets of this Corporation will be distrib-
uted to an organization exempt from Fed-
eral income tax as an organization de-
scribed in section 501(c) (3) of the United 
States Code." That resolution was adopt-
ed, however, before this controversy arose 
and at a time when both Coon and Sher-
rard were directors and therefore members 
pursuant to section %03. The recitals in 
the resolution were accurate, and there is 
no evidence that Coon or Sherrard were 
misled thereby or in any way changed their 
position to their detritnent in reliance 
thereon. Accordingly, no basis for an es-
t~ppel appears. (Driscoll v. City of Los 
Angeles (1967), 67 Cal2d 297, 305, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 661, 431 P.2d 245 and cases there cit-
ed.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
McCOMB, PETERS, TOBRINER, 
MOSK, BURKE and SULLIVAN, JJ., 
concur. 
the incorporators and that the under-
signed incorporators are members of the 
Board of Directors of said corporation." 
